These two articles aren't related to the same vulnerability. The U of M paper describes problems with the proposed 802.1x security features such as session-hijacking and man-in-the-middle attacks.
As far as the risk or level of concern; the potential for serious damage is there, but this type of attack requires some effort and isn't likely to be seen outside of a contrived attack. If you think your organization is at risk for targeted attacks, you might consider IPSEC over wireless or just don't use wireless at all.
The article in question talks about man-in-the-middle attacks that are possible even with 802.1x enabled. The problem is that 802.1x does not provide two-way authentication or security association (rogue access-points).
I don't think that this type of problem is likely to be widely exploited, but it isn't fair to say that 802.1x makes your WLAN secure.
Allow me to clarify, WLAN is secure using Cisco LEAP (expensive), MIC, WEP Key Hashing, Dynamic Session Key, and Non-Broadcast SSID.
The ACS RADIUS authentication give two-way authentication, and MIC/WEP hashing/Dynamic Key Session will stop man-in-the-middle and session hijacking attacks. I'm not even surprise if NSA can not break-in aside from brute force decrypting the 128-bit Dynamic Session Key.
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(#)For this reason being that : - application that doesn't use multicast, sends one copy of each packet ( data unit of traffic at layer 3 ) to each client (" who seeks the traffic ).- application that does use multicast, sends ...
Transferring Crash file from standby:
Login to the Active WLC in HA.
(Cisco Controller) >transfer upload datatype crash
(Cisco Controller) >transfer upload filename <Desired filename>
(Cisco Controller) >transfer up...
This is the start of a display filter cross reference between Wireshark and OmniPeek.
The 1st installment is a table of advanced filters. More filters will be added as time allows.
It is a living doc, so check back for changes every so often
Please feel ...